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INHOSPITABLE HOSTS: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN
RECRUITMENT PRACTICES OF H-2A GUEST WORKERS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
Elyse T. Watkins*
I. INTRODUCTION - RECRUITMENT REVEALED
Every year thousands of transnational, temporary agricultural
workers leave their home country to harvest crops for ten months in the
United States ("U.S.").1 These migrant workers are employed in low-wage,
temporary jobs in the U.S. on H-2A visas for agricultural work.2 Although
the H-2A program includes some basic requirements to protect foreign
workers from exploitations, the structure of the H-2A program-including
the dependence of H-2A workers on their employers-is inherently flawed
and leads to a system filled with widespread abuse.'
Often, a workers' experience with U.S. agribusiness begins with the
recruiter. The recruiter's level of involvement in the recruitment and
migration process varies. Some recruiters simply connect the worker with
the employer and petition for a visa interview at a U.S. consulate, leaving
the worker to sort out the logistics.4 Another recruiter may (might)
organize passport documentation, setup consular appointments, arrange
travel logistics, and provide room and board throughout the process.
5
Although recruiters can protect migrant workers by removing them from
* Notes Editor, KY.J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L., 2015-2016; B.A. 2009, The
College of Wooster; J.D. expected May 2016, University of Kentucky College of Law.
I H-2,4 Guestworker Program, FARMWORKERJUST.,
http://www.farmworkerjustice.org/content/h-2a-guestworker-program (last visited Nov. 10, 2015).
2 Etan Newman, No Way to Treat a Guest: Why the H-2AIAgricultural Visa Program Fails US. and
Foreign Workers, FARMWORKERJUST.,
http://wwwarmworkejustice.org/sites/default/files/documents/7.2.a.6%20No%20Way%20To%20T
reat%20A%20Guest%20H-2A%2OReport.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2015).
3H-2 Guestworker Program, supra note 1.
4
Recruitment Revealed: Fundamental Flaws in the H-2 Temporary Worker Program and
Recommendationsfor Change, CENTRO DE LOS DERECHOS DEL MIGRANTE, INC. 13,
http://www.cdmigrante.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Recruitment-Revealed-Fundamental-
Flaws-in-the-H-2-Temporary-Worker-Program-and-Recommendations-for-Change.pdf (lasted
visited Nov. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Recruitment Revealed].
5
id.
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abusive workplaces, or even organizing repatriation, the migrants'
dependence on them for so many services also creates many opportunities
for exploitation and abuse.6 Creating debt through exorbitant fees incurred
by the worker at the point of recruitment services is a major source of the
exploitation.7 These debts can subsequently tie the worker to both an
exploitive employer and recruiter!
The current recruitment process is often opaque, sometimes corrupt,
and largely lacking in accountability. "The lack of transparency in the
process obscures worker exploitation and shields those responsible for the
abuse from liability."' Additionally, the actions of recruiters in foreign
countries pose a multijurisdictional enforcement issue.1" Thus, "the
existing recruitment system is an intricate web that is often difficult for
workers and their advocates to untangle."1 The complex recruitment
system, in addition to the legally documented H-2A guest workers
exclusion from U.S. labor and employment laws, make these guest workers
feel less like guests and more like intruders-despite carrying government
issued work visas authorizing them to work within the United States.12 The
U.S., therefore, should provide oversight, protections, and enforcement of
the H-2A visa program.
Part II of this article will address the history of the agricultural guest
workers in the United States, as well as the legal rights of the guest workers
provided by the H-2A visa. Part III illustrates the realities and abuses of
H-2A visa holders by labor recruiters and employers. Part IV demonstrates
the need for effective changes to the H-2A program. Finally, part V
recommends a dual approach to increase oversight, strengthen protections,
and better enforce the H-2A system.
"Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, What We Know: Regulating the Recruitment of Migrant Workers,
MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Sept. 2013), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/what-we-know-
regulating-recruitiment-migrant-workers.
7
Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, What We Know About Regulating the Recruitment ofMigrant
Workers, 6 MIGRATION POL'Y INST. 4 (Sept. 2013), available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/what-we-know-regulating-recruitment-migrant-workers
(follow hyperlink "download brief").
I Id. at 4.
9 Recruitment Revealed, supra note 4, at 12.
"Newman, supra note 2, at 22.
i Recruitment Revealed, supra note 4, at 12.
'2 Lisa Guerra, Modern-Day Servitude:A Look at the H-2A Program's Purposes, Regulations, and
Realities, 29 VT. L. REV. 185, 186 (2004).
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II. THE H-2AAGRICULTURAL GUEST WORKER PROGRAM
A. The History ofAgricultural Guest Worker Programs
1. Slave Labor
The search for cheap farm labor nearly always begins abroad. Since the
beginning of colonization, the importation of slavery enabled colonies to
exploit a productive workforce while minimizing labor costs. When the
international slave trade ended in the United States in 1808, internal slave
trading continued, and the slave population would eventually peak at four
million before abolition by the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865.13 Similar
issues occurred in the nineteenth century as growers established farms on
the frontier using low paid Chinese, Filipino, and Japanese workers.4
These foreign farm laborers had weak immigration statuses, economic
hardships, and faced racial discrimination, leading to the deprivation of
bargaining power and political clout with the United State government."
2. The First Bracero Program
The first bracero program was an agreement between the United States
and Mexico in 1917, which allowed more than 70,000 Mexican
farmworkers to enter the U.S. temporarily to work on sugar, beet, and
cotton farms.16 The bilateral agreement was made to supplement a labor
shortage crisis in the agriculture industry caused by World War 1.
17
Although the program ended in 1921, iany of the workers, known as
Braceros, ( meaning "one who works with his arms" in Spanish) stayed in
the United States because employers refused to pay for their transportation
home.18 Subsequently, when the Great Depression occurred, foreign
"3 TbeAbolition of the Slave Trade: Introduction, N.Y. PUB. LIBRARY,
http://abolition.nypl.org/home/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2015); Lincoln Mullen, These Maps RevealHo~w
Slavery Expanded across the United States, SMITHSONIAN.COM (May 15, 2014),
http://www.smithsonianmag.comlhistory/maps-reveal-slavery-expanded-across-united-states-
180951452/?no-ist, AmendmentXIII :Abolition of Slavery, NAT'L CONSTITUTION CTR.,
http://constitutioncenter.org/constitution/the-amendments/amendment-13-slavery-abolished (last
visited Nov. 10, 2015).
14 PHILLIP MARTIN, IMPORTING POVERTY?: IMMIGRATION AND THE CHANGING FACE OF
RURAL AMERICA 20-23 (2009).
'5 Newman, supra note 2, at 12.
'
6
MARTIN, supra note 14, at 23-24.
'
7
Newman, supra note 2, at 12.
Id.
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workers were seen as a threat to domestic workers, and subsequently nearly
a half-million of the former Braceros were repatriated to Mexico.19
3. A New Bracero Program
The next bracero program was an agreement between the United
States and Mexico in 1942, which was initially designed to bring a few
hundred Mexican laborers to harvest sugar beets in California.2 ° Like the
first program, the agreement was designed to ameliorate the labor shortage
caused by World War II by allowing U.S. employers to import temporary
agricultural laborers from Mexico.21 Despite the agreement's modest
beginning, at its peak it drew more than 400,000 workers a year across the
border.22 By the time of the program's abolition in 1964, Mexican workers
had filled 4.5 million jobs.
23
From one perspective, the Braceros merely replaced the labor of men
sent off to war. From another perspective, the Braceros replaced and
encouraged bias against organized black farmworkers.24 "Accustomed to
workers disciplined by the starvation wages of the Depression years,
growers were outraged to find black workers uncooperative and organized.
They demanded the importation of foreign workers who could be deported
for refusing to work, and their demands were heeded."2 5 Thus from the
beginning, the purpose of importing Mexican farmworkers was to exploit
them for profit.
The bracero program had legal protections in place for Mexican
farmworkers, such as the available methods of recruitment, transportation,
standards of health care, wages, housing, food, and the number of hours
"Garry G. Geffert, H-2,I Guestworker Program: A Legacy oflmportingAgricultural Labor, in
THE HUMAN COST OF FOOD: FARMWORKERS' LIVES, LABOR, AND ADVOCACY 113,115 (Charles
D. Thompson & Melinda F. Wiggins eds. 2002); Teaching, BRACERO HIST. ARCHIVE,
http://braceroarchive.org/teaching (last visited Nov. 10, 2015); Guerra, supra note 12, at 188.
20 Mary Bauer, Close to Slavery: Guest worker Programs in the United States, S. POVERTY L. CTR.
3 (2013), http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downtoads/pubfication/SPLC-Close-to-Slavery-
2013 .pdf.
21 Newman, supra note 2, at 12; Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Latinos in the United States: Invitation and
Exile, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN TIE
UNITED STATES 190, 194 (Juan F. Perea ed. 1997).
2 Bauer, supra note 20, at 3.
23 Id.
4 Guerra, supra note 12, at 189.
Id. (quoting Cindy Hahamovitch, Standing Idly By: 'Organized Farmworkers in Soutb Florida
During the Depression and World War I1, in THE HUMAN COST OF FOOD: FARMWORKERS' LIVES,
LABOR, AND ADVOCACY 89,89 (Charles D. Thompson,Jr. & Melinda F. Wiggins eds. 2002)).
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the Braceros were allowed to work.' The Mexican government even
demanded that there should be no discrimination against Braceros.27
Despite these regulations, the bracero program became notorious for the
widespread abuse of foreign workers due to growers and the U.S.
government ignoring the regulations, thereby subjecting migrant laborers
to the most oppressive working environments.' Because of their inability
to read in English, most Braceros were unaware of the terms of their
contracts.29 For example, many Braceros were cheated on their wages, lived
in unsanitary conditions, were transported in unsafe vehicles, and denied
access to healthcare."
Due to this lack of bargaining power, Braceros were unable to increase
their wages, which in turn caused unattractive, stagnated prevailing wages
for domestic workers as well.31 Thus, the availability of Braceros
undermined the ability of U.S. workers to demand higher wages.
Consequently, Congress abolished the program in 1964, but foreign
workers were still imported under the H-2 programs, which were created in
1943 when the Florida sugar cane industry hired Caribbean workers to cut
sugar cane on temporary visas.
32
The H-2 guest worker programs were similar to the bracero program,
but lacked government-to-government agreements.3 3 In 1986, the H-2
program was revised and changed significantly as part of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act, which simplified the application process and
separated the H-2 program into two temporary worker programs: H-2A
for agricultural workers and H-2B for non-agricultural workers.' In 2012,
the United States issued about 65,000 H-2A visas.35 In continuing its
predecessor's traditions, the H-2A guest worker program is afflicted by
some of the same problems as the discredited bracero program.
2 Bauer, supra note 20, at 4; Guerra, supra note 12, at 190.
27Carrasco, supra note 21, at 195.
2' Newman, supra note 2, at 12; Guerra, supra note 12, at 190.
2' Bauer, supra note 20, at 4.
'0 Newman, supra note 2, at 12.
31 Id. at 13.
12 Id.; Bauer, supra note 20, at 4.
33Newman, supra note 2, at 13.
Bauer, supra note 20, at 5; Guerra, supra note 12, at 191.35 Alan Gomez, In Immigration Fight, Farm Visas Provide an Opening, USA TODAY (Mar. 17,
2013, 5:20 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/03/17/immigration-guest-
workers/1946699/.
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B. The H-2A Visa
The McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act established
the current H-2A guest worker program in 1952, and allows the Attorney
General to issue visas for temporary agricultural labor.36 H-2A visas are
temporary visas that allow United States employers to hire temporary
foreign workers for agricultural jobs in the United States if there are not
enough domestic workers available to do those jobs.37 The purpose is "to
assure agricultural employers an adequate labor force while at the same
time protecting the jobs of U.S. workers."' Accordingly, domestic
employers who cannot find or retain local employees for low wage
agricultural work apply with the United States Government to hire foreign
workers, with 83% of these workers coming from Mexico.39 The
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which simplified the
application process for an H-2A visa, later reformed the Immigration and
Nationality Act.'
To acquire an H-2A visa, an employer first applies and gains approval
from the Department of Labor and then files the application "stating that
there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified, and
available, and that the employment of aliens will not adversely affect the
wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers."41 This
adverse effect is the "downward pressure on wages, associated with the
hiring of temporary foreign workers."42 Once the Department of Labor
certifies a lack of domestic workers, the employer obtains approval from the
Department of Homeland Security and then acquires the visas from the
State Department.43
3 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (2015).
37Jornaleros Safe, JORNALEROS SAFE (Apr. 2013),
http://www.globalworkers.org/sites/default/files/Infographicjomaleros-SAFE.pdf.
m U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/PEMD-89-3, THE H-2A PROGRAM:
PROTECTIONS FOR U.S. FARMWORKERS, at 12 (1988), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/150/147036.pdf.
398 U.S.C. § 1101; JORNALEROS SAFE, supra note 37.
o Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 301 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1188 (2000)); Guerra, supra note 12, at 191.
4 Work Authorizationfor Non-US. Citizens: Temporary Agricultural Workers (H-2A Visas),
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/elaws/elg/taw.htm (last updated Sept. 2009).
42Bauer, supra note 20, at 6.
4 3
Executive Summary: Mexican H2A Farmwaorkers in the U.S.: The Invisible Workforce,
JORNALEROS SAFE 8,
http://www.globalworkers.org/sites/default/files/EXECUTIVE%20SUMMARY%20Jomaleros%20S
AFE.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2015).
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Federal laws and Department of Labor regulations do exist to protect
H-2A workers from exploitation, as well as to safeguard U.S. workers from
adverse impacts.'M H-2A workers must be paid wages that are "the highest
of: (a) the local labor market's 'prevailing wage' for a particular crop, as
determined by [the Department of Labor] and state agencies; (b) the state
or federal minimum wage; or (c) the 'adverse effect wage rate."'45 This
prevents the undercutting of domestic workers' wages and the offering of
substandard wages to foreign workers.'M Many employers, however, violate
wage requirements.47
H-2A workers are legally entitled to receive at least three-fourths of the
total hours promised in their contract (the "three-fourths guarantee").'
The three-fourths guarantee requires that employers provide recruited
workers with employment opportunities for at least three-quarters of the
number of hours in the job offer, or otherwise pay for any deficiency, with
an exception for "Acts of God."49 This provision protects against "over-
recruitment," which drives down wages, and assures migrants who travel
long distances that the job will be worthwhile." Like the wage violations,
however, "many [H-2A] workers are not paid [what] they are promised
under the three-fourths guarantee."51
H-2A workers must receive free housing in good condition, as well as
meals, or access to a cooking facility, for the period of the contract.2 These
requirements prevent hardships and homelessness due to the lack of
"temporary accommodations in rural areas."' Too often, however, the
housing requirement is not met and workers live in poor and unsanitary
conditions due to a lack of oversight.' Furthermore, farm owners prevent
farmworker advocates from "meeting [with] workers in their homes"
because the owners claim the home and land "is their private property.
" 55
H-2A visa holders must receive workers' compensation benefits for
medical costs, payment for lost time from work, and payment for any
-See 20 C.F.R. § 655.122 (2015); 45 C.F.R. § 1626.11(2015);
" Newman, supra note 2, at 15.
46Id.
47 Id.
-20 C.F.R. § 655.122(i).
' Newman, supra note 2, at 15.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(d) (2015); 20 C.F.R § 6 55.122(g) (2015).
53 Newman, supra note 2, at 15-16.
See id. at 16.
5id.
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permanent injury.56 The inclusion of workers' compensation is designed to
prevent the burden of healthcare for work related injuries from falling on
both domestic and foreign workers. In practice, however, "employers
[can] send injured foreign workers home" and thereby successfully block
the foreign worker's access to the workers' compensation benefits."8
H-2A workers must be reimbursed for the cost of travel from the
worker's home to the job as soon as the worker finishes fifty percent of the
contract period.59 This requirement enables the recruitment of migrant
workers from outside of an employer's immediate location, reduces the
traveling debts incurred by H-2A workers on their journey to the United
States, and guarantees that foreign workers can afford to return home.'
Additionally, H-2A visa holders must be protected by the same health and
safety regulations as other workers, and are eligible for federally funded
legal services concerning matters related to their employment as H-2A
workers.
61
Farm owners must offer wages, conditions, benefits, and follow certain
procedures that protect domestic farmworkers.62 Employers are prohibited
from discriminating against domestic workers and must "replace any H-2A
worker with an available domestic worker, up to the mid-point of the H-
2A worker's contract period."'3 Thus, H-2A visa holders are not
guaranteed employment through the contract end date until the mid-point
is reached. Employers must also circulate job offers through the U.S.
Employment Service and participate in recruitment practices, like placing
local newspaper or radio ads, in order to attempt to hire domestic
workers.64
Positive recruitment for domestic workers, however, rarely happens in
a manner likely to lead to the hiring of local workers. Employers place tiny
classified ads that run during the middle of the week, or play radio
commercials that run early in the morning.6 Other strategies used include
56 See 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(e) (2015).
" Newman, supra note 2, at 16.
58 Id.
59 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(h) (2015).
' Newman, supra note 2, at 16.
61 20 C.F. R § 655.122(a) (2014); 45 C.F. R § 1626.11(a) (2014).
U.S GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/PEMD-89-3, THE H-2A PROGRAM:
PROTECTIONS FOR U.S. FARMWORKERS 13 (1988), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/150/147036.pdf.
' Guerra, supra note 12, at 192-93.
Id. at 193.
65 Id.
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dreadful descriptions of the job to discourage any local interest, and to
conduct interviews in a hostile manner.
66
Unfortunately, too many of the protections available to H-2A workers
exist only on paper. Despite the available protections, when an H-2A
worker finds that the work situation is abusive and/or not as promised, the
only realistic recourse available to the worker is to go home.67 When the
worker leaves prematurely, the worker places himself in a disadvantageous
position because "his ability to return during any subsequent season
depends entirely on an employer's willingness to submit a request to the
U.S. government" asking that the worker return.' Thus, the H-2A
worker's dependence on the sponsorship of the employer for future
employment creates a situation in which an employee is much less likely to
complain about wage violations or other abuses.
In addition to the dependence on the employer for future work
opportunities in the United States, other obstacles H-2A farmworkers face
include ineffective enforcement and exclusion from U.S. labor laws.69 The
number of scattered regulations, combined with the fact that there are
several bureaucratic levels with various governmental departments involved
in the enforcement of H-2A regulations, leaves both the H-2A visa holder
and the government agent in obscurity, creating difficulty in determining
compliance.7' Furthermore, the H-2A system says absolutely nothing
about remedying noncompliance.71 Even more shocking, the Department
of Labor allows self-investigation by employers accused of violating
regulations.72 The ambiguity and lack of guidance creates a bias in favor of
the employer.
Although H-2A visa workers are now provided the ability to sue in
federal court if the terms and conditions of their employment contract are
violated, the filing of a federal lawsuit is not a practical option.73 First, most
H-2A visa workers are unfamiliar with their rights, and are therefore
unaware of when and how they can enforce their rights through private
litigation.74 Second, H-2A workers are entitled to federally funded Legal
' Id. at 194.
67 Bauer, supra note 20, at 6.
68 id.
69 Guerra, supra note 12, at 195.
70id.
" Id. at 196.
72id.
73 45 C.F.R. § 1626.11(a) (2014); Bauer, supra note 20, at 40.
74Bauer, supra note 20, at 40.
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Services lawyers, but are prohibited from bringing class action lawsuits.75
Finally, due to the workers' fears of retaliation and blacklisting by their
employer, whom the migrant worker is tied to, a worker is unlikely to bring
a case challenging the system alone.76
H-2A farmworkers are also excluded from U.S. labor laws.77 H-2A visa
holders are exempt from the National Labor Relations Act, which provides
protections for workers who strike, organize, and bargain collectively.7" H-
2A visa holders are also exempt from the overtime provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, as well as the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Worker Protection Act.79 Although H-2A workers are eligible for legal
representation in federal court by Legal Aid attorneys, employers deny
communication between Legal Services lawyers and H-2A workers.8 0
Thus, when the terms of their contract are violated, H-2A workers' access
to the legal remedy is blocked by an employer who can fire, blacklist, and
send home a temporary farmworker who most likely has acquired debts
during the recruitment process.
III. RECRUITMENT REALITIES AND ABUSES OF THE H-2A VISA
HOLDER
A. The Private Recruitment Process
As globalization progresses, workers are eager to move across national
borders in order to secure employment unavailable in their locality. Within
this labor market, recruitment bridges the gap between the employer and
prospective migrant workers." The role of the recruiter is to guide the
migrant worker through the immigration process, match the worker with
an employer, and inform the worker of the job and living conditions.'
Thus, when a domestic employer has received certification for a certain
number of H-2A visas, an employer usually hires labor recruiters to locate
the workers who will apply for these visas.
75 45 C.F.R. § 1626.11(a); Bauer, supra note 20, at 40.76 Bauer, supra note 20, at 40-41.
" See Guerra, supra note 12, at 197.
78 id.
79 Id.
8'45 C.F.IR § 1626.11(a); Guerra, supra note 12, at 197.
's Agunias, supra note 7, at 2.
2id.
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Generally, recruiting is irregular and informal.' The level of
involvement by labor recruiters in the recruitment and migration process
varies widely. "Some recruiters organize the passport paperwork, the
consular appointment, travel, and room and board during the process.
Other recruiters simply connect the worker with the employer by
petitioning for a visa interview at a U.S. consulate in Mexico, but leave the
worker to arrange all other logistical components."s' In addition to using
recruiters, employers sometimes use staffing agencies and lawyers to act as
recruiters by either directly locating the migrant agricultural worker, or by
subcontracting with a recruiter to find workers."5 Nearly all H-2A
employers rely on recruiters to find available agricultural workers in their
home countries and organize their visas and transportation to their
employment in the fields.8
6
There are several models of recruitment used in the H-2A visa system.
The first is the employer-Mexican recruiter-worker model.8 7 Here, the
employer contracts directly with Mexico-based recruiters and the recruiter
then locates workers to fill the job. 8 The second is the employer-American
recruiter-Mexican recruiter-worker model.8 9 The employer hires a U.S.
based recruiter who subcontracts a Mexico-based recruiter to assist in the
efforts to fill the employer's job vacancies."° The third is the employer-
American recruiter-American recruiter-Mexican recruiter-worker model.9
Here, the employer hires an American recruitment agency and that agency
subcontracts a second American recruitment agency.9' The second
recruitment agency subcontracts a Mexican recruiter to help find workers.93
The fourth is the employer-American recruiter-worker model.94 The
employer hires an American recruitment agency that then directly tracks
down workers to fill the job vacancy.9" The fifth is the employer-worker
model. Here, the employer asks the temporary migrant workers to recruit
g3 CENTRO DE LOS DERECHOS DEL MIGRANTE, INC., supra note 4, at 11.
'4Id. at 13.
8" Id. at 12.
g Bauer, supra note 20, at 9.
7 CENTRO DE LOS DERECHOS DEL MIGRANTE, INC., supra note 4, at 11.
g8 id.
89Id.
90Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
%Id.
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for the available jobs during their annual return to Mexico between
seasons.9 7 This Note focuses on recruitment in the migrant workers' home
countries, outside of the United States.
1. Abuses to Guest Workers
Temporary migrant workers are especially vulnerable, and particularly
susceptible, to abuse. The goal of a migrant worker is to move from a
poorer community to a wealthier one, thus multiplying their potential
earnings as a result of the migration." These migrant workers are willing to
transnationally search for a job due to underdevelopment, unemployment,
underemployment, violence, environmental devastation, and restrictions
on individual freedoms." Low-wage migrant workers often arrive from
impoverished communities-predominantly impoverished rural
communities-with limited economic opportunities."° Both the workers
and their local communities depend upon the repatriation of income
earned through the labor of H-2A workers.' Therefore, temporary
migration is not truly temporary for these workers-constant migration is
necessary for survival. This need to escape poverty, combined with the fact
that the majority of workers are unaware of their rights as agricultural
workers, leaves the worker in a vulnerable position as an easily exploitable
individual. °2 These exploitations include: (1) fraud, (2) discrimination, (3)
fees, and (4) waitlist and blacklist placement. Since the recruiting process
occurs predominantly outside of the United States, it remains largely
unregulated."°3
97 id,
" U.N. General Assembly, 2013 High-level Dialogue on International Migration and
Development, Jan. 24, 2013, Assessing the Effects of International Migration on Sustainable Development
and Ident!ffing Relevant Priorities in View of the Preparation of the Post-2015 Development Framework,
1, available at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/68/meetings/migration/pdf/Background paper_HLDRT1.pdf.
" International Labour Organisation, Towards a Fair Dealfor Migrant Workers in the Global
Economy, Report VI, International Labour Conference, 92d Session, Geneva (2004), at 8, available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc92/pdf/rep-vi.pdf [hereafter ILO].
" U.N. General Assembly, supra note 98, at 1.
1m Id.
'2JORNALEROS SAFE, supra note 37.
103 Newman, supra note 2, at 22.
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2. Fraud
Migrant workers face recruitment fraud due to the lack of available
information about their rights, lack of oversight, and lack of
transparency.1" Scam artists offer work opportunities under the H-2A
program that do not actually exist. They charge a service fee for finding the
fictitious work and then disappear."l 5 Without any real way to verify the
legitimacy of a person claiming to be a recruiter, migrant workers desperate
for work take a chance that the employment offer is valid.1" "Inevitably,
many migrant workers are caught in recruitment fraud schemes and lose
hundreds, if not thousands, of dollars with no effective system in place to
help them track down or report the thieves who have stolen their
money." °7 Therefore, information asymmetry poses a real issue for guest
workers.
An additional fraud by those claiming to be a recruiter includes the sale
of a visa "libre" (meaning "free" or "at liberty" in Spanish).l"' The fraudster
sells an H-2 visa "libre" to a worker who is told the visa allows him to enter
the United States legally and work any job.10 9 This type of "visa" is
normally the most expensive since it purports to allow the worker the most
freedom of mobility. 0 On average, a visa "libre" costs the migrant worker
$1,846.111 Unfortunately, the same recruiters that offer authentic H-2A
visa will also sell H-2 visas "libre." n2
Bona fide recruiters can also commit recruitment fraud. In order to
attract more migrant workers, recruiters will misrepresent the jobs
available. 3 There are no penalties for their misrepresentations because the
recruiter lacks accountability and can charge higher recruitment fees for
personal benefit.1 1 4  These misrepresentations include higher wages,
greater or fewer hours, more optimistic job descriptions, and even the
'04 CENTRO DE LOS DERECHOS DEL MIGRANTE, INC., supra note 4, at 20.
105 Id.
106id.
108JORNALEROS SAFE, supra note 43, at 15; Libre, OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/translate/spanish-english/libre#1ibre-1 (last visited Jan. 19,
2015); At Liberty, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/translate/english-
spanish/libertyq=at+liberty#at liberty (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
"'JORNALEROS SAFE, supra note 43, at 15.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 16.
113 Id. at 21.
114 CENTRO DE LOS DERECHOS DEL MIGRANTE, INC., supra note 4, at 21.
2015-2016]
480 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L.
industry in which the employee will work."1 When the worker accepts the
recruiter's offer and arrives in the United States to find a completely
different employment reality, the worker does not have any legal action to
hold the recruiter or employer liable for failing to uphold the terms of the
agreement because there is no written contract, or if there is a contract, it
was provided only in English.16 Thus, even if the contract terms
correspond with the employment reality, the worker is unable to compare
the written terms with the oral terms that he initially agreed.
3. Discrimination
Recruiters also habitually engage in discriminatory recruitment of
guest workers.117 Women and older adults are significantly absent from the
H-2A program." Women comprise more than twenty percent of
farmworkers, yet there are little to no women in the H-2A program.1 9
Recruiters seek a specific demographic for domestic employers; young
males with no family in the United States.120 This is one factor that makes
the H-2A guest worker program attractive to domestic employers; the
ability to recruit young men thought to be perfect for agricultural work.21
Although domestic employers are prohibited from discriminating
against U.S. workers based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
some court circuits have found that age discrimination in hiring H-2A
workers is not unlawful.122 For example, the Second Circuit has found that
because the age discrimination occurrs outside of the United States the
discrimination is therefore exempt from litigation."l Furthermore, the
discrimination of women was unveiled in a class action lawsuit where a
labor recruiter chose less qualified male workers for H-2A jobs, and placed
women in the less desirable H-2B jobs.1" This kind of pervasive
discrimination easily leads to other types of discrimination against race and
115 Id.
16 Id.;JORNALEROS SAFE, supra note 37.
117 Bauer, supra note 20, at 31.
.. Newman, supra note 2, at 26.
"9 Id. at 27.
'20 Id. at 26.
121 id.
'22 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (2012)); Reyes-Gaona v. N.C. Growers Ass'n, 250 F.3d
861 (4th Cir. 2001).
' Reyes-Gaona, 250 F.3d at 867.
Olvera-Morales v. Intl Labor Mgmt. Corp., No. 1:05CV00559, 2008 WL 506090, at *1
(M.D.N.C. Feb. 20, 2008).
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national origin, thus perpetuating the exploitation and abuse of guest
workers.
4. Fees
Although recruitment fees are illegal in both the United States and
Mexico, it remains common practice for Mexican recruiters to charge fees
to workers hopeful for an H-2A visa.125 Like the variable recruiting
methods, illegal fees vary by recruiter as well. Some recruiters charge a one-
time, lump sum fee, while others charge the costs for the visa,
transportation, and room and board separately.a26 Some recruiters even
require that the worker pay a sum more than the cost of the visa directly to
the recruiter's personal bank account.127
The variation makes it challenging for workers to understand which
fees are permitted under the H-2 program and which fees are excessive or
illegal.2 According to a 2009 Centro de los Derechos del Migrante
survey, 58 percent of workers reported paying an average of $590 in
recruitment fees.'29 This average fee, however, does not include additional
costs such as travel, visa, and other fees incurred to cross the U.S.
boarder.a30 Thus, guest workers end up paying hundreds to thousands of
dollars in costs for the opportunity to work seasonal, agricultural jobs in the
United States where they will often earn a wage similar to the legal
minimum wage.
131
In order to afford the recruitment fees, many visa hopefuls take out
loans.132 Fortunate migrants have friends or family members loan them
the required funds, but most go to a private lender, bank, or even the
recruiter.133  Interest rates on these pre-employment loans vary from
moderate to high, ranging from five to seventy-nine percent interest."
Some lenders also require that the worker provide a deed or title to
property as collateral.13
12'20 C.F.R. § 655.1350) (2014); 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(h) (2014); Ley Federal del Trabajo
[LFT] [Federal Labor Law], Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DOF] i de Abril de 1970, as amended
2013 (Mex); CENTRO DE LOS DERECHOS DEL MIGRANTE, INC., supra note 4, at 16.
"2 CENTRO DE LOS DERECHOS DEL MIGRANTE, INC., supra note 4, at 16.
127 id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
1321 Id. at 18.
133 Id.
134 Id.
13 5
Id.
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These high fees and excessive loans leave the migrant worker in a
precarious position. High interest rates put workers in danger of becoming
imprisoned in debt, and the collateral requirements can lead to the loss of
the worker's fundamental property, like vehicles or homes." Furthermore,
when workers with predatory loans arrive in the United States to work,
they are then confronted with the additional pressure to earn back the
borrowed funds."7  Subsequently, the necessity to earn back borrowed
money can force migrant workers to continue working in hazardous or
abusive conditions due to their dependence on the employer and their fear
of losing a job acquired through borrowed funds. Moreover, a worker
would likely do almost anything to comply with a company or person that
holds the deed to the home where his wife and children reside.
5. Waitlist and Blacklist Placement
Recruitment fraud includes additional fees for getting on a waitlist in
order to be selected to work in the United States.138 Not only are fees
charged to ensure the guest worker is chosen to work in the U.S, but they
are charged again for being chosen to work with an H-2A visa."9 The fee
is collected when the worker attempts to be placed on the waitlist, when the
worker signs a contract, or before the worker enters the consulate to apply
for the visa."4 The worker is at greater risk if he pays the fee prior to
receiving approval for the visa because the worker might not actually
receive the visa, and, subsequently, the migrant worker will be denied both
the employment opportunity and the money paid in order to receive the
opportunity.4
Recruiters also have a practice of charging fees to more workers than
are actually needed for a job, ultimately placing the workers on a waitlist.142
Although some workers never receive a visa, they tend to not report the
abuse.'43 The left out workers know that some of the people on the waitlist
got a job in the U.S., so the left out workers fear that if they report the
abuse they will not be chosen for U.S. employment the next time the
recruiter is searching for temporary agricultural workers.
144
136id.
1
37 id.
"38JORNALEROS SAFE, supra note 37, at 12.
.39 Id. at 14.
140 Id. at 15.
141 Id.
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Recruiters employ waitlists and blacklists to control H-2A workers, 145
and charge workers an upfront fee to be placed on a waiting list to receive
an H-2A visa.1" Workers can pay up to $160 to be placed on such a list.147
As indicated, this list does not guarantee a visa or agricultural employment
in the U.S., but workers understand that placement on the waitlist is the
only way they might be chosen to work in the United States."
Blacklists are used to prevent the worker from complaining or
reporting abuses and/or poor working conditions.149 Placement on a
blacklist excludes a worker from future employment in the United States.
1 50
Therefore, an H-2A visa hopeful, who is desperate for work in order to
support his family, prefers to keep silent and keep working in abusive
conditions or conditions that are not as promised.151 The disincentive is
even more pronounced when the worker knows that any resistance,
insubordination, or complaints made will lead to retaliation and the
inability to obtain future employment in the United States.152 Temporary
migrant workers have no ability to apply for an H-2A visa independently;
they must be sponsored by a domestic employer.1l 3 Thus, guest workers
who report or complain know they will not be offered the opportunity to
work the following season, and will therefore not report insufficiencies or
abuses.
54
These abuses are exacerbated by the fact that the H-2A "program
requires that guest laborers work only for the employer who sponsored
their visa and that they leave the country when their visa expires."l Thus,
guest workers are tied to a single employer. Moreover, due to the fees and
debts incurred in order to secure the employment, the employee will do
nothing to jeopardize their job security.156 When the guest worker realizes
the recruiter's deception he can either remain in an abusive situation and
hope to earn enough money to pay his debt, return home with little to no
chance of repaying the debt, or leave his employer and become
4
1 Id. at 12.
4 Id.
147 Id.
148/d.
1
49
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150 id.
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undocumented and risk retaliation, blacklisting, and loss of legal status.
"Tethered to a single employer and often unable to return home due to
crushing debt, guest workers are extremely susceptible to debt servitude
and human trafficking."" 7 The United States should not remain an
involuntary accomplice in this illegal recruitment system of fees, predatory
debt, and fraud that leads to exploitation and human trafficking.
IV. CONCLUSIONS- THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE CHANGES TO H-2A
RECRUITMENT
Private recruitment coordinates the majority of the migration to
temporary agricultural work. The current structure of the of the H-2A visa
program allows recruiters and employers to erode the rights and dignity of
guest workers due to the dependence the workers have on these
recruitment players for the visa and numerous other services. From slavery
to the bracero program to fees and debts, guest workers have been treated
more like indentured servants than like guests. Temporary, migrant
farmworkers work in hazardous conditions for low wages. These workers,
however, contribute to the U.S. economy and, therefore, deserve respect.
The United States is a nation of immigrants and should not be willfully
blind to the abuse and exploitation of these migrant workers.
Employers contract with foreign recruiters in order to employ laborers
without the protections entitled to domestic workers, and to remain
unfettered to recruitment abuse and willfully ignorant of recruitment
practices. The informal, complex, multi-party system currently at play in
the recruitment of H-2A workers creates an intricate web of protection for
both the employers and the recruiters of guest workers. The recruitment
system's obscurity in the supply chain leaves the worker, and even those
who would attempt to advocate for farmworkers, unsure of whom to hold
liable for deceptions and exploitation. This subsequently allows recruiters
to consistently escape liability. The inability to monitor the practices of
employers and recruiters encourages the exploitation of H-2A migrant
workers, and allows employers to ignore the few wage and labor protections
provided to guest workers.
The intricate and lax recruitment system is complicated by the
international configuration of the recruitment dealings. Partnerships
between domestic employers and foreign recruiters limit the legal avenues
available to migrant workers and their advocates to seek reparation for
157 Bauer, supra note 20, at 13.
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recruitment abuse."'8 The legal protections available to guest workers
within the United States are inapplicable to practices committed outside of
the country."9 Furthermore, Mexican law that prohibits abuses to migrant
workers is largely unheeded by the Mexican government.16°
The United States has little information about recruiters and the
recruiting industry due to a lack of monitoring and documenting the H-2A
visa recruitment process.161 The majority of information available derives
from advocacy organizations and agencies who have documented deceptive
and abusive recruitment activities.162 Thus, the information available is not
standardized or centralized, making access difficult while also fostering
incomplete and conflicting records.63 This hinders policymakers' and
advocates' ability to recommend and affect change within the system of
recruitment because of the limitations placed on their ability to inform
themselves.
The recruitment scheme has been left in the hands of individuals that
take advantage of those most desperate for work."M The lack of attention
the U.S. government has placed on the recruitment process has, "created a
vacuum that deceptive recruiters have taken advantage of to obtain millions
of dollars by offering non-existent work in the U.S. or visas to cross safely
into the United States."165 The lack of consideration placed on recruitment
irregularities supports a structure that exploits guest workers who should be
sheltered because of their status as guests. The U.S. government should
ensure that H-2A workers are protected from their home country until
repatriation.
A. Recommendations
The current recruitment scheme is inconsistent with the United States'
values of democracy and fairness. Thus, to ameliorate the existing
recruitment structure, Congress should offer a two prong approach to
migrant workers: (1) for migrant workers who want to permanently
immigrate to the U.S., offer enough permanent visas to reflect the
agricultural employers' need for labor and attempt to fill that labor need
.s CENTRO DE LOS DERECHOS DEL MIGRANTE, INC., supra note 4, at 24.
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from this pool of workers first, and (2) for migrant workers who do not
wish to permanently immigrate, fill any remaining labor shortages with this
pool of workers. Congress should increase oversight, protections, and
enforcement for these temporary workers. This approach will provide the
guest worker options and protections, lessen the chance for abuse by
recruiters, and allow the agriculture industry permanent workers instead of
guest workers.
To ultimately end illegal recruitment fraud and schemes, Congress
should end the need for private recruitment by no longer requiring foreign,
temporary, agricultural workers to return to their home country every one
to three years. Despite the fact that some farm work is seasonal,
agricultural work is required year round. Thus, the agriculture industry
requires permanent workers, not guest workers. Therefore, Congress
should offer permanent visas ("green cards") to enough migrant workers to
reflect agricultural employers' long-term labor needs.
A green card allows the holder to live permanently in the United
States."6 A green card holder can perform any legal work of his choosing.
167
Most importantly, all laws of the United States, the state of residence, and
the local government protect a green card holder.68 Providing permanent
visas instead of temporary H-2A visas will effectively reduce the need of
recruiters because the worker will not return to their home country after a
job has ended. A reduction in the amount of recruiting will positively
correlate with recruitment abuses and exploitation. Furthermore, the green
card holder will have the full force of the law when recruiting abuses or any
other abuses occur.
Agricultural employers should be required to employ U.S. farmworkers
and green card holders before they employ H-2A guest workers. Like the
protections the H-2A program's "fifty percent rule" offers to foreign
farmworkers and the mandatory recruitment of U.S. workers offers to
domestic farmworkers, employers should not be allowed to prefer guest
workers who are more desperate for employment and who lack full rights.
Allowing this preference would only continue the status quo of deception
and exploitation, as well as maintain the high occurrences of recruitment
and, subsequent, fraud and abuse.
6 Rigbts and Responsibilities ofa Green Card Holder, U.S. CITIZENSHIP&IMMIGR. SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/after-green-card-granted/rights-and-responsibilities-permanent-
resident/rights-and-responsibilities-green-card-holder-perinanent-resident (last visited Jan. 20, 2015).
67id.
168 id.
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Fulfilling long-term labor shortages in the agriculture industry with
green card holders effectively eliminates the need for continuous
recruitment. Once the demand for recruitment is little to non-existent,
recruitment abuses will diminish as well. Likewise, discrimination in hiring
green card holders for farm work will be illegal because a green card offers
protection by all laws of the United States.
Only after the employer hires U.S. and green card workers should the
employer then petition the Department of Labor for guest workers. The
petition must demonstrate a good faith effort to recruit domestic and green
card workers, and justify the need for these temporary, foreign agricultural
workers. Thus, employers should first hire from the pool of U.S. and green
card candidates, and then justify any remaining labor shortage in order to
be able to sponsor any H-2A visas.
Sound public policy requires that the U.S. meet its agricultural labor
shortage needs, not with human commodities, but with people who have
respect and rights, and who want to establish themselves in the community.
Migrant workers will most likely chose the green card over a temporary visa
because of the mobility and legal rights the permanent visa provides. A
green card does not limit the ability of the cardholder to return to his home
country. However, some migrant workers may prefer a temporary work visa
because they intend to return home. Thus, the U.S. should also protect
those remaining in the H-2A program.
Although a green card provides protection by all laws and the freedom
of mobility, some migrant workers do prefer circular migration because
they either prefer to not live in the United States, or they have family
residing in their home country. Thus, any additional agricultural labor
shortages not fulfilled by domestic and green card workers should be filled
by a reformed H-2A guest worker program that provides oversight,
protections, and enforcement of its laws and regulations. This dual
approach will protect migrant workers while filling labor shortages in the
agriculture industry. In reforming the current H-2A visa program,
Congress should evaluate three broad categories: oversight, protections,
and enforcement.
B. Increasing Oversight of Worker Protections in the H-2A Program
The Department of Labor should increase its oversight of the H-2A
program and its recruitment practices.69  In compliance with the
aforementioned dual approach, the Department of Labor should
' Newman, supra note 2, at 37.
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investigate the recruitment strategies of employers who daim a labor
shortage so great that H-2A guest workers are required to fulfill the
employer's labor needs. The Department of Labor should also commence
unannounced visits to all employers who sponsor H-2A visas to ensure
compliance with recruitment regulations and to speak with guest workers
about their recruitment experience.17 Likewise, farmworker advocates
should not be barred from entering the property due to any private property
status in order to confirm compliance and the guest workers' wellbeing.
Close oversight and supervision will incentivize employers to ensure their
compliance with laws and regulations. Furthermore, the unveiling of
recruitment abuse or exploitation of agricultural workers of any kind will be
unpopular and, therefore, bad for agribusiness.
C. Strengthening Worker Protections in the H-2A Program
The most important protection that should be available to guest
workers is the ability to change employers without sacrificing their H-2A
visa status.171  Employers would not tolerate recruitment fraud and
deception if the guest worker was free to find other employment when the
terms of the contract are not upheld or conditions are not as described.
Furthermore, the employer himself is incentivized to treat the guest
workers with respect because the workers are not dependent on the
employer. Thus, the allowance of guest workers to transfer jobs would
ameliorate many of the current concerns of the recruitment process by
empowering the guest worker and discouraging abuse and exploitation.
H-2A employers should be held strictly liable for any and all
recruitment costs, including any collateral the worker relinquished.
Employers strictly liable for recruitment costs will discourage exploitation
and over-recruitment, as well as prevent abusive debt servitude of the guest
worker.72 Likewise, H-2A employers should also be held jointly liable for
any recruitment abuse carried out by any recruiter of the employer.7 3 A
few recruitment policy changes will increase the protections available to
guest workers, not only regarding recruitment, but their overall
employment experience. These protections will incentivize respect and
discourage abuse, and ultimately comport with the ideals of fairness, free
market, and democracy.
170/id.
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D. Enforcement of Worker Protections in the H-2A Program
H-2A guest workers should be allowed to file class action lawsuits with
federally funded legal services.74 Class actions are the most effective forms
of legal recourse with regard to employment abuses.17 Additionally, access
to class action litigation lessens the fear guest workers have regarding
deportation and blacklisting.76 Thus, the ability to bring a class action
would increase the likelihood that guest workers would actually assert their
rights.
Employers can deport or blacklist those who complain about abuses,
therefore, many guest workers fear retaliation if they assert their legal
rights.177 Congress should view the H-2A visa as a legitimate claim of
entitlement to the guest worker and, as such, should afford procedural
protections.178 An administrative agency, such as the Department of
Labor, should grant a hearing and find procedural due process prior to the
revocation of the H-2A visa and blacklist placement. The procedural
protection acquired by the guest worker will prevent retaliatory employers
from carelessly sending the worker home, thus preventing future
employment in the U.S.
The mistreatment of those in the H-2A temporary foreign agricultural
worker program is widespread. More than one hundred thousand workers
are affected each year by the H-2A programs appalling recruitment
system.79 The constraints applied to guest workers prevent the migrant
workers from protecting themselves and asserting their legal rights.
Congress should address this failed recruitment system. The two-fold
approach described here will protect guest workers from further
recruitment exploitation, and will ameliorate abusive practices in general.
These guest workers are valuable contributors to the economy and
community. As a nation of immigrants, the U.S. should shelter these
guests, not ignore their suffering. Failure to do so will result in continued
abuse and exploitation of these guest workers.
174 Bauer, supra note 20, at 45.
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